San Jose State University

SJSU ScholarWorks
Master's Projects

Master's Theses and Graduate Research

2008

Practical Detection of Metamorphic Computer Viruses
Sharmidha Govindaraj
San Jose State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Govindaraj, Sharmidha, "Practical Detection of Metamorphic Computer Viruses" (2008). Master's Projects.
93.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.9wzu-ucm4
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects/93

This Master's Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses and Graduate Research at
SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Projects by an authorized administrator of SJSU
ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.

Practical Detection of Metamorphic
Computer Viruses

A Writing Project
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Computer Science
San Jose State University

By
Sharmidha Govindaraj

December 2008

Approved by: Department of Computer Science
College of Science
San Jose State University
San Jose, CA

____________________
Dr. Mark Stamp

____________________
Dr. Robert Chun

____________________
Mr. Manikandan Veerachamy, CISCO systems

Acknowledgements

I would like to sincerely thank my advisor Dr. Mark Stamp for his expert guidance,
thoughtful insights and bountiful patience without which this research is impossible. I
would also like to thank him for introducing me to this interesting world of information
security. I would also like to thank my committee members Dr. Robert Chun and Mr.
Manikandan for taking time to read through my thesis and providing valuable
comments.
Also, I’m grateful to my loving husband Vetri for his endless love and constant
encouragement which provided me vast energy throughout my graduate studies.
Special thanks to my adorable little one Dharshan for adapting to my tight schedules
and sacrificing his play-time with me.

Abstract
Metamorphic virus employs code obfuscation techniques to mutate itself. It absconds
from signature-based detection system by modifying internal structure without
compromising original functionality. However, it has been proved that machine learning
technique like Hidden Markov model (HMM) can detect such viruses with high
probability. HMM is a state machine where each state observes the input data with
appropriate observation probability. HMM learns statistical properties of “virus features”
rather than “signatures” and relies on such statistics to detect same family virus. Each
HMM is trained with variants of same family viruses that are generated by same
metamorphic engine so that HMM can detect similar viruses with high probability when
encountered later on.

Previous HMM-based detection techniques have relied on opcode sequences which are
obtained by disassembling the binary (executable) code. Such an approach is
impractical, since the disassembly process is slow, and this process must be applied to
each file when scanning for viruses. In this paper, we develop a practical HMM-based
metamorphic virus detector. We efficiently parses a Windows PE file and generate an
approximate opcode sequence which is then used for scoring against the HMM. The
results show that our method produce opcode sequences effectively, eliminate timeconsuming disassembling phase, reduce training time of HMM by 70% and produce
clear separation of scores between family virus and non-members.
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1. Introduction
In today’s electronically connected digital world, data is stored in the connected
storages and shared globally. Modern technology has changed the way we learn, work,
play, and live but it does not offer luxury of high availability and accessibility without
endangering the security and privacy of information. No matter how secure data is
stored and accessed, information still get stolen. Everyday and every second,
somebody in the world has his/her identity and money seized. Even worse, information
which is worth lots of time, energy, and resources is completely wiped out by malicious
programs causing huge loss. As we all understand, the modern digital world poses
multifaceted vulnerabilities, a major concern is to protect data from being corrupted or
destroyed by malicious codes.
Malicious code is “any code added, changed, or removed from a software system to
intentionally cause harm or subvert the system's intended function" (Jordan, 2002).
Malicious code can be classified as virus, worm, Trojan, backdoors, and so on.
Although all malicious codes are commonly called virus, each of the above term mean a
type of attack the malicious code perform. For our purpose, we refer the commonly
used term ‘virus’ to address all malicious codes in discussion for this project. Computer
viruses have been consistently evolving. Each new generation of viruses poses new
challenges for antivirus developers. Fortunately, antivirus developers do rise to the
challenges and devises a method to protect data from viruses as they show up.
Our research focuses on a specific type of virus called metamorphic virus that uses
obfuscating techniques to mutate itself. We will discuss further about detecting
metamorphic viruses and enhancing one of the detection technique called Hidden
Markov Models (HMM).
The organization of this report is as follows; Section 2 covers viruses and their types
with an emphasis on metamorphic virus (with examples); Section 3 covers available
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detection techniques with an emphasis on HMM; Section 4 covers our research on
detecting metamorphic viruses more practically and efficiently using HMM; Section 5
covers the training and testing of HMM; and finally, Section 6 covers the discussion of
results.
Figure 1 shows number of new malicious threats every year.

Figure 1. New Malicious Code threats
Source: Turner et al., 2008

2. Viruses and their types
Viruses are malicious programs that have threatened the world of computers for about
thirty years; and will be more challenging than ever before. As the modern viruses
present new challenges, the antivirus community is constantly putting efforts to
understand, learn, and develop new antivirus kits to detect and remove viruses. There
are many types of viruses with different risk levels we have discovered.
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Some of well known viruses are
•

Boot sector virus

•

Polymorphic virus

•

Macro virus

•

Metamorphic virus

The following section explains in-depth details of metamorphic virus followed by brief
introduction to other viruses.

2.1 Metamorphic Virus
Metamorphic viruses are viruses that mutate itself with the use of metamorphic engine
that come along with virus code. These viruses are a new generation of viruses that
escape signature detection techniques, as the shape of virus body is changed every
time when it infects. To explain in short, metamorphic viruses mutate its body and
change the internal structure preserving the functionality of virus.
Such metamorphism is employed by obfuscating the code using different techniques.
Five of the techniques are listed below (Mohammed, 2003).
•

Simple Substitution

•

Instruction Reordering

•

Dead code Insertion

•

Register usage exchange

•

Reordering subroutines
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Figure 2 shows different shapes of virus body in each mutation (Szor, 2002).

Figure 2. Different forms of a metamorphic virus
Source: Szor, 2001
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Simple Substitution

This technique allows for the substitution of an instruction or a block of code with an
equivalent instruction or a block of code. To accomplish this technique, the
metamorphic generator must maintain a dictionary of instructions and their equivalents.
An example showing how substitution is done is illustrated in figure 3 below.

Code obfuscated through instruction
substitution

Original Code
push eax
push ebx
push ecx
push edx
push esi
push edi
push ebp
mov ebp, 0
mov eax, 1
CPUID
cmp ax, 0F20h
jb error
clc
mov di, ax
mov ecx, 02Ch
RDMSR
shr eax, 16
and al, 00000111b
movzx bx, al
shl bx, 1
mov [si], bx
error: pop ebp
pop esi
pop edi
pop edx
pop ecx
pop ebx
pop eax

Obfuscated by
Simple
Substitution

xor ebp, ebp
xor eax, eax
or eax, 1
CPUID
mov bx, ax
cmp bx, 0F20h
jb error
lahf
and af, 0FEh
sahf
mov di, bx
mov bx, 02ch
movzx ecx, bx
RDMSR
rol eax, 16
and al, 00000111b
xor bx, bx
mov bl, al
shl bx, 1
mov [si], bx
error: popad

Figure 3. Simple Substitution
Source: Author’s Research
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2.1.2 Instruction Reordering
Reordering instructions and inserting unconditional branches or jumps using GOTO
statements is one way of metamorphism employed in virus body. Reordering can also
be done by reordering the independent instructions in the same way compilers do.
Figure 4 below illustrates an example of instruction reordering.

Original Code
mov ax, 0A000h
mov es, ax
xor edi, edi
push 0
pop ds
mov esi, 0B000h
mov ecx, 64 * 1024
shr ecx, 02h
rep movsd es:[edi], ds:[esi]

Obfuscated by
Instruction
Reordering

Code obfuscated through instruction
reordering
mov ax, 0A000h
jmp s1
s2: jmp s3
s4: mov esi, 0B000h
jmp s5
s1: mov es, ax
xor edi, edi
jmp s2
s3: push 0
pop ds
jmp s4
s6: shr ecx, 02h
jmp s7
s5: mov ecx, 64 * 1024
jmp s6
s7: rep movsd
es:[edi], ds:[esi]

Figure 4. Instruction reordering
Source: Author’s Research
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2.1.3 Dead Code Insertion

This technique inserts do-nothing or garbage instructions like NOP inside the virus
body without altering original functionality. This is one of the easiest techniques to
obfuscate the code section and the easiest to detect as the actual virus code is not
rearranged. Dead code insertion is illustrated in Figure 5.
Code obfuscated through Dead Code
Insertion
mov ebx, 0F5h
push ebx
add ebx, 1
sub ebx, 1
pop ebx
push edx
push eax
mov eax, 75h
rol eax, 16
ror eax, 16
mul ebx
inc eax
add esi, 0
adc edx, 0
mov ebx, eax
mov ecx, edx
push ecx
mov ecx, 1
l1:
loop l1
pop ecx
pop eax
jmp s1
s1:
pop edx
nop
nop
neg ebx
xchg ebx, edx
xchg edx, ebx
mov [esi], ebx

Original Code
mov ebx, 0F5h
push edx
push eax
mov eax, 75h
mul ebx
inc eax
adc edx, 0
mov ebx, eax
mov ecx, edx
pop eax
pop edx
neg ebx
mov [esi], ebx

Obfuscated
by Dead
Code
Insertion

Figure 5. Dead code insertion
Source: Author’s Research
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2.1.4 Register Usage exchange
Register Usage Exchange is a technique which involves changing usage of registers in
the code without modifying the flow of code. This technique often requires adding more
instructions for resetting or restoring the state of the registers. It seems to be more
complex compared to other techniques as it requires knowledge of processor registers
and supported instruction sets along with the ability to parse the binary code section
and identify the register usage. Figure 6 below illustrates register usage exchange.

Code obfuscated through register
reassignment

Original Code
mov ebx, 0F5h
push edx
push eax
mov eax, 75h
mul ebx
inc eax
adc edx, 0
mov ebx, eax
mov ecx, edx
pop eax
pop edx
neg ebx
mov [esi],ebx

Obfuscated
by
exchanging
registers

push esi
mov esi, 0F5h
push edi
push edx
push eax
mov eax, 75h
mul esi
inc eax
mov edi, edx
adc edi, 0
mov esi, eax
mov ecx, edi
pop eax
pop edx
pop edi
neg esi
mov ebx, esi
pop esi
mov [esi], ebx

Note: EBX replaced with ESI and EDX replaced with EDI

Figure 6. Register usage exchange
Source: Author’s Research
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2.1.5 Reordering Subroutines
Obviously, using this technique, metamorphic engine reorders subroutines and thus
changes the structure of the code. The above technique is another simple technique to
obfuscate the shape of the virus. Reordering Subroutines is illustrated in figure 7 below.
Code obfuscated through instruction
reordering
memory_copy PROC
mov esi, 0A000h
mov edi, 0B000h
mov ecx, 10 * 1024
rep movsd es:[edi],ds:[esi]
memory_copy ENDP

Original Code
count_0s_eax PROC
push eax
push edx
xor ebx
mov ecx, 32
i1:
shr eax, 1
jc i2
inc ebx
i2:
loop i1
pop eax
pop edx
ret
count_0s_eax ENDP
multiply_ebx_by_5 PROC
push eax
push edx
mov eax, 5
mul ebx
mov ebx, eax
pop edx
pop eax
ret
multiply_ebx_by_5 ENDP

Obfuscated by
Reordering
Subroutines

count_0s_eax PROC
push eax
push edx
xor ebx
mov ecx, 32
i1:
shr eax, 1
jc i2
inc ebx
i2:
loop i1
pop eax
pop edx
ret
count_0s_eax ENDP
main PROC
call count_0s_eax
call multiply_bx_by_5
call memory_copy
ret
main ENDP

memory_copy PROC
mov esi, 0A000h
mov edi, 0B000h
mov ecx, 10 * 1024
rep movsd es:[edi],ds:[esi]
memory_copy ENDP

multiply_ebx_by_5 PROC
push eax
push edx
mov eax, 5
mul ebx
mov ebx, eax
pop edx
pop eax
ret
multiply_ebx_by_5 ENDP

main PROC
call count_0s_eax
call multiply_bx_by_5
call memory_copy
ret
main ENDP
END main
Figure 7. Reordering subroutines
Source: Author’s Research
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2.2 Other viruses
One of the oldest and popular viruses from the late 1980s is boot sector virus. It
replaces Master Boot Record (MBR) or boot sector in the hard drive with its own code.
The boot sector is a drive sector where the Operating System (OS) boot loader lives.
The Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) transfers control to the boot sector at the end of
Power-On Self-Test (POST) to hand off control to the OS while booting. Infecting the
boot sector enables the boot virus to gain the ability to take over the control whenever
the system boots, stay hidden in memory during runtime, and perform its malicious
activities.
One of the other popular and challenging viruses is polymorphic virus. It uses
encryption to get away from antivirus software that only uses simple signature detection
technique to detect viruses. Each polymorphic virus incorporates a decryptor at the top
of an execution flow so that the virus can decrypt the encrypted part of the code at first
and hand off the control to decrypted virus. As a polymorphic virus usually embeds the
decryptor at the beginning of the code section, it enables anti-virus scanners to look for
decryptor byte patterns at the beginning of a code section and detect the virus easily.
A Macro virus is a type of virus that mainly infects documents that are normally not
executable. It is written in a macro language that is supported by word processors and
email applications; this provides mechanism to embed macro programs within
documents and execute it whenever the document is opened. Modern Antivirus
software has the capability to detect such macro viruses.

3. Metamorphic virus and their detection techniques
As metamorphic viruses employ complicated techniques, many different methods have
been developed to detect metamorphic viruses. Each detection method has its own
pros and cons. Some of the detection techniques described in Symantec’s white paper
(Szor, 2001) are highlighted below.
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Geometric Detection technique relies on “shape heuristic”; this allows to find whether a
file is infected, or not, by learning the file structure of the virus and looking for learnt
structures in the infected files. Often, this technique is prone to false positives as it
simply learns the layout of the virus and does not learn about the virus at the instruction
level.
Code emulation is employed by creating a virtual machine which emulates the
underlying hardware including processor, memory, and peripherals and runs an
operating system. This technique detects viruses by running suspicious files on its guest
virtual machine and looks for any malicious activities and patterns. The above technique
has the ability to detect complicated viruses but it needs considerable system resources
to create a virtual machine.
The last and most successful technique is the Machine learning technique. This
technique uses the concept of data mining, neural networks, and HMM to learn the
structure of the virus at the instruction level. Though, data mining techniques produce
more false positives, neural networks and HMM have a very low rate of false positives.
As our research is focused on using HMM for metamorphic virus detection, HMM will be
discussed in detail in the following section.

3.1 Hidden Markov Models
The Hidden Markov Model is a state machine with a finite set of states, each of which is
associated with a probability distribution for certain observation symbols. This model is
called “Hidden” Markov Model because the external observer can only see the outcome
or the observation, and the state remains hidden. Transition between states is
associated with transition probability and an outcome, or observation is associated with
observation probability. HMMs are statistical learning techniques by which we can train
the model for particular observation sequence (opcode sequence from a program). After
training a HMM with a set of opcode sequence, the model gains the ability to detect
similar opcode sequence in a given input.
CS298 Report
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The notations used in HMM are listed below.

T = the length of the observation sequence
N = the number of states in the model
M = the number of observation symbols
Q = the states of the Markov process {q0, q1, . . . , qN−1
V=set of possible observations {0, 1, . . . ,M −1}
A = the state transition probabilities matrix
B = the observation probability matrix
π = the initial state distribution matrix
O = (O0, O1, . . . ,OT−1) = observation sequence.
λ= (A, B, π) is a HMM model

Figure 8 below shows the Hidden Markov Model state transition where X is a hidden
state and O is observation sequence which an observer can see.

Figure 8. Hidden Markov Model
Source: Stamp, M., 2004
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4. Metamorphic detection with HMM
Initially, HMM is trained with variants of same family viruses (viruses generated with
same virus generation kit) during which HMM create a model for each family viruses.
Once training is completed, HMM use that model to detect whether a given file belongs
to particular family, or not. Before the training phase, a number of steps should be
carried out. Let us examine the steps involved in Wong and Stamp’s (2006) work; first,
different viruses are generated using virus generators; second, the generated viruses
are assembled using TASM 5.0 to create executables; and finally, the executables are
disassembled back into assembly code using IDA Pro. The above steps are illustrated
in Figure 9 below.

Figure 9. Preprocessing of virus files
Source: Wong and Stamp (2006)

Once disassembled, they extracted assembly opcode sequences from disassembled
ASM files and concatenated all the opcode sequences to form a single long sequence.
Finally, HMM was trained with the single concatenated sequence. Large collections of
metamorphic viruses generated by virus generator kits are grouped into different data
sets with each data set containing viruses generated by same Virus generation kit. Five
fold cross validation is applied to a data set and further subdivided into five subsets: four
being training sets and one being a test set; each time, a different train set and test set
is used. Training set viruses are used for HMM training and test set viruses are used to
test, or evaluate the performance of HMM in finding the same family virus.
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5. Efficient preprocessing of metamorphic virus executables
As explained in section 4, Wong and Stamp used IDA pro, a disassembler, to
disassemble the executables before extracting the opcode sequence for the training set.
This disassembling step is time-consuming, inefficient, and impractical when it involves
large numbers of virus files. An alternative method is to extract the opcode sequences
directly from executables and use the resultant sequence to train HMM.
Extracting opcode sequences programmatically from binary executables with no manual
work involved is very complicated, as the binary file is raw and, in most cases, data is
embedded within the code section. This research is focused on simplifying and
completely removing the manual work involved in the process of creating opcode
sequence and improving the efficiency of overall preprocessing. In our method, we
followed three consecutive steps to preprocess a virus file. The steps involved in the
method of preprocessing under discussion as are follows;
1. Extracting Code section: An executable may include a number of sections
such as code, data, and stack. As virus codes mostly lives only in code
section, we need to extract the code section from the executable file
discarding other sections. Though there are a lot of executable formats
currently in use, we have taken only Portable Executable (PE) format and
DOS executable format into consideration as these formats are most-used
popular formats.
2. Create opcode sequence: Analyze each virus file individually and determine
Most Frequently Occurred (MFO) mnemonics. Find out all possible opcodes
for MFO mnemonics and create a lookup table of MFO opcodes. The opcode
sequence is created directly from the executable files by scanning byte by
byte and checking if it falls into MFO opcodes by looking into the MFO
opcode table.
3. Concatenate opcode sequence: Finally, opcode sequences are divided into
data set and train set. All opcode sequences of data set are concatenated to
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form a single observation sequence. This observation sequence is used as
train set for HMM.

5.1 Extraction of code segments from Virus executables
5.1.1

PE executable format

PE executable (PE) format is a “file format for executables, object code, and DLLs, used
in 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Windows operating systems” (Wikipedia).

I have

focused on PE executables as it is the most used and most vulnerable format being the
standard of windows OS. Before dealing with extraction of code segment from PE
executables, it is essential to discuss bits and pieces of PE file format to have a good
idea of PE executable. The subsequent sections describe PE format in detail and how
to extract code section from PE format compliant file. The format of a PE file is shown
figure 10 (Page 16).

MS DOS header
A PE file always starts with a MS DOS header that can be identified by a two-byte
signature represented in ASCII as “MZ” or in hex as “0x5A4D”. Though MS-DOS header
is comprised of many fields, e_magic and e_lfanew are the fields we are interested in.
e_magic field contains the signature of MS DOS header and e_lfanew contains Relative
Virtual Address (RVA) to PE header. It also includes a checksum file that can be used
to check the integrity of the header.

A MSDOS stub program is included in windows 32 and 64 bit format to display a
message “This program cannot be run in DOS mode” when PE executables are run
under MSDOS environment.

This header was embedded in PE executables to provide backward compatibility when
the industry was transitioning from DOS operating system to Windows operating
system.
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Figure 10. PE executable format Layout
Source:
Microsoft PE specification, 2008
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PE header
The MS-DOS header is followed by PE header that contains a PE signature File header
and Optional Header. The PE signature is used to identify the PE header in a PE file
which is represented by a 4-byte value in ASCII as “PE” or in hex as “0x00004550”
Among the many fields file header contains, we are interested in two important fields.
Those fields and their usages are explained in Table 1.

Table 1. PE file Header

Source: Microsoft PE Specification, 2008

Since optional header is not required for our purpose, the field SizeOfOptionalHeader is
used to skip the optional header.

Section Header
Followed by the optional header is a section header that contains information about
different sections of the file. Table 2 shows all the fields in section header. Section
header is an array of structures where there is a structure for each section containing all
the fields as shown in table 2 (Page 18). The name field and characteristics field are
required to find the code section. The pointertorawdata and sizeofrawdata fields are
used to locate and extract the code section. Table 3 (Page 20) shows section header
characteristic flags.
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Table 2. PE Section Header Fields

Source: Microsoft PE Specification, 2008
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Table 3. PE Section Header Characteristic Flags

Source: Microsoft PE Specification, 2008
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Figure 11 shows the layout of PE executable in more detail with signatures, partitioned
file, and optional header and pointers from section header entry to appropriate sections.

Figure 11 Detailed Layout of PE executable
Source: Patriek, 2002

5.1.2

PE Code Segment Extraction

This section explains how our program extracts code segment from PE executables
with reference to actual codes. Figure 12 (page 22) demonstrates a high level execution
flow of code segment extraction.

First, the DOS header is read and the e_magic field is checked for MS DOS signature
“MZ” or “0x5A4D”. If the signature is valid, then we have to jump to PE header using the
address in e_lfanew field. Once the PE header is read from the file, the signature field is
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checked for PE signature “PE” or “0x00004550”. If the signature is valid, the file being
processed is confirmed as a PE executable file. Once PE header is located and
validated, the SizeOfOptionalHeader field is used to skip the optional header since
optional header is not required for our purpose. Now we have reached the section
header.

The section header is an array of structures where there is a structure for each section
in the file. So, to find the section header for code section, we have to compare the name
field to “.text” or characteristics field to “0x0000020”. As the name field is not
standardized, it is not named always “.text” and so we are checking for characteristics
field too. According to characteristics flags, “0x0000020” mean that the section contains
executable code. So, once the code section header is located, the field called
PointerToRawData is used to locate the code section, and the field called
SizeOfRawData is used to extract the code section.

After completing the code segment extraction, the program is tested with different input
exe files. All the tested files differ in size or number of code sections. Further testing is
conducted by using HexEdit and PEdump utilities, a dumping utility for executables. The
same exe files, which were used for testing our program is given as input to both of
these utilities. The output of our program is binary compared with utility outputs.
Comparison showed that our code worked flawlessly and extracted code segments
exactly.
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Begin

yes

No
e_magic=”MZ”

MS DOS header found

Not a valid PE file

Jump to RVA in
e_lfanew field

End

yes

Signature =
“0x00004550”
PE header found &
file validated

No

Not a valid PE file

skip optional header for
“SizeOfOptionalHeader” bytes

End

characteristics=
“0x0000020”

yes

No

Code section not found
Jump to RVA in “PointertoRaw”
data field
End
Extract code section upto
“SizeOfRawData” bytes

End
CS298 Report

Figure 12. PE Code section extraction flow
Source:
Author’s Research
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DOS executable Format

Although DOS executables seem to be outdated, many early viruses, like G2 and
MPCGEN, are yet in the DOS executable form. MS DOS header in DOS executables is
exactly the same as in PE executables. For our purpose, we are required to read
following fields: e_magic, e_cblp, e_cp and e_ip. e_magic field contains the signature
represented in ASCII as “MZ” or in hex as “0x54AD”. This field is validated to check
whether the given file is a valid DOS file. If DOS executable signature is found, e_cp,
e_ip and e_cblp field are read from the header. e_ip field specify the offset where code
segment starts. e_cp field specify number of pages in the file where each page is 512
bytes long. e_cblp field specify number of bytes used in the last page of code segment.

Once we get the values of all the above fields, size of the code segment is calculated as
follows,

Size of code segment = e_cp*512 - (512 - e_cblp)

Once size of code segment is calculated, extract the code section starting from the
offset pointed by e_ip.

5.2 Preprocessing of Code Segment and Opcode extraction
As discussed earlier, Wong and Stamp used IDApro, a disassembler, to create
disassembled ASM files and extract assembly opcode sequences from executable files.
One of the goals for this project is to eliminate time-consuming and inefficient
disassembling process.

With the code section of virus executables in hand, we started researching for methods
which doesn’t go through disassembling to extract assembly opcodes like MOV, ADD
and so on. We found two obvious alternatives. First method is Most Frequently
Occurred (MFO) opcode searching method which looks for the MFO opcodes in the
binary executable and creates the opcode sequence of MFO opcodes. Second method
is adding a part of disassembling code which disassembles on the fly with no manual
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intervention and extracting only the opcodes leaving behind operands. Of these two
alternatives, we selected the former approach because latter involves disassembling
and our major goal is to skip disassembling.
5.2.1

Intel x86 Instruction Set

A brief introduction to Intel x86 instruction set is required to understand low level details
of assembly instruction. Figure 13 shows Intel instruction format.

Each instruction consists of instruction prefixes, instruction opcode bytes, MOD value,
address displacement value and an immediate data. The format of an Intel x86
processor architecture based instruction is shown in the figure 13 below. The assembly
language commands corresponding to opcodes are called mnemonics. For example,
the assembly language command ADD is a mnemonic corresponding to the opcode
0x80.

Figure 13. Intel instruction format
Source:
Intel Programmer’s Manual
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The purpose of different fields of an instruction set is described below.

1. Instruction prefixes are used as modifiers to the main command. Prefixes can be
used to repeat string operations, to provide segment overrides, and to change
operand and address sizes.
2. An opcode is a one or more bytes long binary representation of assembly
language mnemonic. While assembling, the assembler translates mnemonics to
corresponding codes.
3. Mod field allows specifying which of the general purpose registers or addressing
modes are used in an instruction.
4. Displacement field is used to provide a displacement value to an address
referred in an instruction. For example, an ADD instruction with a reference to an
address displaced by an offset 4056 can be represented as “ADD ax, [bp+di] +
4056”. The displacement can be 1, 2, or 4 bytes long.
5. An immediate operand is a constant, used as an operand in an instruction, which
can be a 1, 2, or 4 bytes value. In an instruction, “ADD ax, 10”, immediate
operand is 10.

Some of the basic properties of such instruction are as follows:
•

The length of an assembled instruction varies based on number of fields and
size of each field used in an instruction.

•

A single mnemonic may be translated into different opcodes based on the
type of operands used.

•

The Mod field varies based on operand used.

•

An operand can be a register, immediate, direct or indirect memory reference
with or without displacement.

•

Some fields are optional.

There are three types of registers: 8-bit, 16-bit and 32-bit registers represented as r8,
r16 and r32. Table 4 below shows registers available in each type.
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Table 4. Registers and corresponding register encodings

Register
Encodings

r8

r16

r32

0

AL

AX

EAX

1

CL

CX

ECX

2

DL

DX

EDX

3

BL

BX

EBX

4

AH

SP

ESP

5

CH

BP

EBP

6

DH

SI

ESI

7

BH

DI

EDI

Source: Intel’s Programming Manual

5.2.2

Preprocessing of executable code segment

Since there are more than 100 instructions in Intel x86 instruction set, rather than
working on all those instructions, it is inevitable to take only the Most Frequently
Occurred (MFO) instructions into account for three important reasons:

1. It is time-consuming to collect binary opcodes covering the whole instruction
set to form opcode table.
2. The opcode table should be as small as possible to achieve better efficiency.
3. Training HMM with small set of MFO instruction opcodes allows HMM to find
patterns or features of virus effectively
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As per Billar, only fourteen instructions in entire Intel instruction set are MFO
instructions. Those instructions are ADD, AND, CALL, CMP, JMP, JNZ, JZ, LEA, MOV,
PUSH, POP, RETN, TEST and XOR. After a careful analysis, we found that using MFO
instructions enables HMM to learn some patterns in the virus code and detect viruses
more effectively. Figure 14 and 15 below shows the percentage of occurrence of 14
MFO opcodes in normal and malicious files respectively.

Figure 14. Frequency of Occurrence of 14 MFO opcodes in normal files (in percentage)
Source:
Billar
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Figure 15. Frequency of Occurrence of 14 MFO opcodes in Malwares (in percentage)
Source:
Billar

As demonstrated in figures 14 and 15, approximately 90% of total instructions used are
14 MFO instructions.

Billar et al. has also discussed the percentage of occurrence of 14 MFO opcodes in
different categories of malwares like Viruses, Worms, Trojans and Bots. Table 5 (page
27) shows the frequency of occurrence in percentage.

As the key idea in our approach is to search for a binary instruction opcode in the code
segment, there are possibilities for false predictions. For instance, when we search for a
1-byte binary opcode, it may potentially hit many operands with same byte value
resulting in false positives. In this context, false positive occurs when an operand or a
part of an irrelevant opcode is detected as an opcode in examination. For example, one
of the opcodes for JMP is 0xEB and one of the opcodes for SUB is 0xEB83. When an
operand 0xEB or the part of SUB opcode is detected as JMP, it is considered as a false
positive prediction.
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Table 5. Frequency of Occurrence of 14 MFO opcodes in different malwares

Opcode

Goodware

Bot

Trojan

Virus

Worm

MOV

25.3%

34.6%

30.5%

16.1%

22.2%

PUSH

19.5%

14.1%

15.4%

22.7%

20.7%

CALL

8.7%

11.0%

10.0%

9.1%

8.7%

POP

6.3%

6.8%

7.3%

7.0%

6.2%

CMP

5.1%

3.6%

3.6%

5.9%

5.0%

JZ

4.3%

3.3%

3.5%

4.4%

4.0%

LEA

3.9%

2.6%

2.7%

5.5%

4.2%

TEST

3.2%

2.6%

3.4%

3.1%

3.0%

JMP

3.0%

3.0%

3.4%

2.7%

4.5%

ADD

3.0%

2.5%

3.0%

3.5%

3.0%

JNZ

2.6%

2.2%

2.6%

3.2%

3.2%

RETN

2.2%

3.0%

3.2%

2.0%

2.3%

XOR

1.9%

3.2%

2.7%

2.1%

2.3%

AND

1.35%

0.5%

0.6%

1.5%

1.6%

Source: Billar

As discussed earlier in Intel x86 instruction set, the length of an opcode varies based on
number of operands, types of registers and types of memory access used in an
instruction. It may be 1, 2, or more bytes in length. As it will be time consuming to
search for longer opcodes, after a careful analysis, it has been found that MFO
instructions are mostly 1 or 2 bytes long. Further, we discovered that more the number
of 2-byte opcodes used to identify MFO opcodes, better the accuracy. Due to the fact
that the probability for an operand or data to have the same value as the two-byte
opcode is less, we have tried to extend 1-byte opcodes to 2-byte opcodes. The 1-byte
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opcode that can not be converted into 2-byte opcode should be located based on some
conditions rather than looking for it indiscriminately. We used a utility called Debug32 to
find 2-byte alternatives for 1-byte opcode. Figure 16 below illustrates how 1-byte
opcode is converted into 2-byte opcodes based on the type of registers used in the ADD
instruction.

1-byte opcode for
ADD r8/m8, imm8
(0x80)

Operand

2-byte opcode

DL (0xC0)

(0xC080)

Operand

2-byte opcode

CL (0xC1)

(0xC180)

Operand

2-byte opcode

BL (0xC2)

(0xC280)

Operand

2-byte opcode

AH (0xC3)

(0xC380)

Operand

2-byte opcode

DH (0xC4)

(0xC480)

Operand

2-byte opcode

CH (0xC5)

(0xC580)

Operand

2-byte opcode

BH (0xC6)

(0xC680)

Figure 16. Convert 1-byte opcode to 2-byte opcode for ADD r8/m8, imm8
Source:
Author’s Research
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As figure 16 illustrates, in the instruction “ADD r8/m8, imm8”, ADD refers to actual
instruction or mnemonic, r8 refers to 8-bit register, m8 refers to 8-bit memory location
and imm8 refers to 8-bit constant. The register references in this instruction can be
substituted with any of the seven 8-bit registers (DL, CL, BL, AH, DH, CH, BH) to extend
1-byte opcode (0x80) into 2-byte opcodes.

After careful analysis of virus source files, we decided to collect all possible opcodes for
register and direct memory addressing instructions and only MFO opcodes for indexed
addressing instructions. Since including all the indexing instructions in the opcode table
introduces all possible byte values from 0x00 to 0xFF in the second byte of the opcode,
the probability of catching false positives is high. For example, binary opcode for
instruction “ADD r8/m8, r8” is 0x02. In general, 1-byte opcode 0x02 can be extended to
2-byte based on type of register or memory addressing used. If we have to include all
the indexing instructions for ADD, opcode table will require having all values from
0x0200 to 0x02FF. With the second byte position having a possibility of any value
between 00 to FF, any operand or sub-opcode with value 0x02 will be detected as ADD
regardless of the second byte.

Though effort has been made to change every 1-byte opcode to 2-byte, there are
instructions whose opcodes cannot be extended. In most cases, the instructions with
AL/AX/EAX as the first operand and imm8 as the second operand have 1-byte opcode.
There is no way to extend these 1-byte opcodes to 2-byte.For example, binary opcode
for instruction “ADD AL, imm8” is 0x04 which is an instruction referring the register AL
directly. There are totally 60 such 1-byte opcodes for 14 MFO instructions of which 35
MFO opcodes are included in the collection. The 35 opcodes collected are the 1-byte
opcodes of CMP, CALL, JMP, JNZ, JZ, POP and PUSH. The 1-byte opcodes for
remaining instructions are neglected to avoid False Positives (FP).Finally, we
maintained two sets of opcode list: 1-byte opcode list and two-byte opcode list.
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A high level flow involved in detecting MFO opcodes are shown in Figure 15 below.

Read 2-bytes from virus file

No

Is 2-byte
opcode found

Translate 2-byte opcode into
mnemonic and write to opcode
sequence file

Read 2-bytes from virus file

Is 1-byte
opcode
found?

yes

No

yes

Translate 1-byte opcode into
mnemonic and write to opcode
sequence file

Figure 17. Flow Diagram for MFO Opcode Detection
Source: Author’s Research
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Since most of the 1-byte instructions are PUSH and POP, we may end up catching
False Positives (FP) for these instructions. So, we checked for certain conditions while
detecting PUSH instructions based on the MFO pattern found in the virus assembly
files. The pattern found for PUSH instruction is that PUSH is always followed by another
PUSH or POP instruction. So, whenever 1-byte PUSH opcode is detected, the
subsequent byte is checked for PUSH or POP. If the subsequent byte is detected as
PUSH or POP, both of the bytes are added to observation sequence. Otherwise, both
bytes are skipped.

In addition to PUSH and POP, we added conditions to detect 1-byte JMP. We noticed
more FP for JMP because whenever our algorithm comes across 2-byte SUB, it is
detected as JMP because both instructions are sharing a common opcode. In this case,
let us consider the 1-byte opcodes 0xEB and 0xE9 for JMP and two-byte opcodes
0xEB83 and 0xE983 for SUB. As you notice here, both of the instructions are sharing
the same opcode 0xEB and 0xE9. To avoid such false positives, whenever we
encounter 0xEB and 0xE9, the consecutive byte is checked for 0x83. If the consecutive
byte is detected as 0x83, both of the bytes are skipped. Otherwise, 1-byte 0xEB or 0xE9
is written as JMP in the observation sequence.

Using our algorithm, the generated opcode sequence for each virus file was 95%
accurate with 5% being FP. It means that 20 out of 450 opcodes in the opcode
sequence are FP.

5.3 Creating Opcode sequence
To create opcode sequences, an input set is formed with executables of virus. Input set
is divided into three sets consisting of family viruses, non-family viruses and normal
files. The virus generated by a same generator belongs to the same family and is
referred as family virus. In contrast, virus generated by different generator belongs to
different family and is referred as non-family virus. Family viruses are named as
“NGVCKexes” consisting of 200 metamorphic virus variants generated by Next
Generation Virus Creation Kit (NGVCK) generator. Non- Family viruses are named as
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“OtherExes” consisting of 25 virus generated by Second Generation virus Generator
(G2) and Mass Code Generator (MPCGEN). It includes

•

15 virus variants generated by Second Generation virus generator (G2)
version 0.70a released in January 1993 representing non-family virus

•

10 virus variants generated by Mass Code Generator (MPCGEN) version 1.0
released in 1993 representing non family virus

The normal files are 40 random utility executables collected from Cygwin DLL (version
1.5.25).

Wong and Stamp collected 10 G2, 10 VCL32 and 5 MPCGEN as non-family virus.
VCL32 generated files has some properties that doesn’t allow us to include it as input
set for our program. VCL32 generated files have all the function definitions inside data
sections and only function calls in code section. Due to the reason that code section is
same in all VCL32 virus executables and our program extracts only the code section to
extract opcode sequences, we have not considered VCL32 files.

Once an input set is created, it is given as input to “create_obs.exe” program where
“Obs” stands for observation sequence or opcode sequence. The output of this program
is the data set and the compare set. A data set of 200 individual files each consisting of
corresponding opcode sequence is created and a compare set of 65 individual nonfamily viruses and normal files consisting of corresponding opcode sequence is created.
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5.4 Training and Testing HMM
Training and testing followed the same methodology of (Wong, 2006). Five-fold cross
validation is applied to the data set and divided into train set and test set. So, train set
consists of 160 virus opcode sequence (four subsets each with 40 viruses) and test set
(one subset) consists of 40 virus opcode sequence. Each time, a different test set is
selected and other four subsets are used as train set. This process is repeated five
times. The length of each train file in data set ranges from 395 to 445 with an average
of 420. So, the typical length of concatenated 160 opcode sequence is in the range of
65,450 to 65,650 with an average of 65,550.

Once HMM is trained with the concatenated opcode sequence, a model is created for
every train set. After training, the test set and compare set is scored with corresponding
trained model. For each file in test set and compare set, Log Likelihood Per Opcode
(LLPO) is calculated as its score. For further details about LLPO, refer (Wong, 2006). A
threshold value is also calculated which is an average of minimum LLPO in data set and
maximum LLPO in compare set. The files with scores above (greater than) the
threshold are classified as virus and files with scores below (less than) the threshold are
classified as non- virus or non member. Training and classifying is explained in figure
18. The steps followed in training and classifying are

1. Train HMM with train set consisting of 160 opcode sequence files
2. Score and calculate LLPO for files in test set and compare set
3. Determine threshold value to classify member virus and non-members
4. Continue step 1 until all test sets are scored

These steps are diagrammatically shown in figure 18 (page 36).
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Figure 18. Training and classifying process
Source:
Wong, 2006

6. Experiment Setup and Results
Section 6.1 describes the input data, platform setup and programming languages used
in the experiment. Section 6.2 provides the results obtained using our method which
eliminates disassembling and works on 14 MFO opcodes. Section 6.3 provides the
results obtained using Wong’s method which uses disassembling and works on all
opcodes in Intel instruction set. In the final section, we compare results of our method
with results of Wong’s method to test the accuracy and efficiency of our method.
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6.1 Experiment Setup
As discussed earlier, input set consists of three set of executables. First set consists of
200 NGVCK executables named as N0 to N199 (N stands for NGVCK), second set
consists of 15 G2 executables named as G2T0 to G2T14 and 10 MPCGEN executables
named as MPC0 to MPC9, and third set consists of 40 Cygwin executables named as
CYG0 to CYG39.
Extracted code section from each virus executable is collected in ICS (Individual Code
Section) Data Set and named as cs_n0 to cs_n199.
Data set consists of 200 NGVCK opcode sequence files named as OBSN0 to OBSN199
(OBS stands for observation sequence and N stands for NGVCK). Compare set
consists of 40 Cygwin opcode sequence files named as OBSC0 to OBSC39 (C stands
for Cygwin) and 25 non-family virus opcode sequence files named as OBSV0 to
OBSV24 (V stands for other virus).

TrainFile consists of 10 files, 5 being “alphabet” file consisting of distinct opcodes in
each train set and 5 being “in” (in stands for input) file consisting of concatenated 160
opcode sequence in test set. Each alphabet and input file is named 160_OBSN_E0 to
160_OBSN_E4. In the file name, 160 stands for number of opcode sequences being
concatenated, OBS stands for observation sequence, N stands for NGVCK and E0
stands for excluded set 0 which is the test set.

With number of states N being different each time ranging from 2 to 6, let us see how
models are named. There are 25 models created by HMM with 5 being created for each
state N. If a model is named as 160_OBSN_N2_E0, then
•

160 is the number of files in train set

•

OBSN stands for NGVCK observation sequence

•

N2 stands for number of states as 2

•

E0 stands for test set 0
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Table 6 below shows the experiment platform and programming languages used.
Table 6. Experiment Setup

Platform
Virus Generators
Programming Languages
Assembler & Linker
Utilities

Windows XP
NGVCK, G2 and MPCGEN
C, Ruby
TASM, TASM32, TLINK, TLINK32, MSVC 6.0,
Ruby
HexDump, Debug32

Source: Author’s Research

6.2 Experiment Results I
With N ranging from 2 to 6, and test sets ranging from 0 to 4, 25 models were created
with HMM.
Let us examine how the HMM separated family viruses from compare set files. All 25
models made a clear separation of scores between family viruses and compare set
files. Each model scored a data set consisting of 40 family viruses and compare set
consisting of 40 normal files and 25 non-family viruses. Table 7 shows LLPO scores of
40 family viruses and 40 normal files. The scores show that LLPO scores of family
viruses are -1.9 or greater and LLPO scores of normal files are -2.1 or lower.
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Table 7. LLPO scores of 40 family viruses and 40 normal files (compare set) using model
160_0BS_N2_E0.
NGVCK Family Viruses

Normal cygwin files

Virus
Name

LLPO

Virus
Name

LLPO

OBSN0

-1.91341

OBSN20

-1.85286

OBSN1

-1.91630

OBSN21

OBSN2

-1.94792

OBSN3

File
Name

LLPO

File
Name

LLPO

OBSV0

-2.15787

OBSV20

-2.52410

-1.85252

OBSV1

-2.10833

OBSV21

-2.58423

OBSN22

-1.87886

OBSV2

-2.48227

OBSV22

-2.42321

-1.78941

OBSN23

-1.94889

OBSV3

-2.49157

OBSV23

-2.44344

OBSN4

-1.81915

OBSN24

-1.91749

OBSV4

-2.39297

OBSV24

-2.51328

OBSN5

-1.88139

OBSN25

-1.84351

OBSV5

-2.53091

OBSV25

-2.63752

OBSN6

-1.89580

OBSN26

-1.82954

OBSV6

-2.75892

OBSV26

-2.21347

OBSN7

-1.85012

OBSN27

-1.87690

OBSV7

-2.75575

OBSV27

-2.46925

OBSN8

-1.86159

OBSN28

-1.85007

OBSV8

-2.48225

OBSV28

-2.54372

OBSN9

-1.91538

OBSN29

-1.89606

OBSV9

-2.46713

OBSV29

-2.46418

OBSN10

-1.83419

OBSN30

-1.93708

OBSV10

-2.48225

OBSV30

-2.50300

OBSN11

-1.78523

OBSN31

-1.87644

OBSV11

-2.46713

OBSV31

-2.85430

OBSN12

-1.88537

OBSN32

-1.80577

OBSV12

-2.37040

OBSV32

-2.47473

OBSN13

-1.82211

OBSN33

-1.84254

OBSV13

-2.71943

OBSV34

-2.24818

OBSN14

-1.90262

OBSN34

-1.86094

OBSV14

-2.71957

OBSV34

-2.49244

OBSN15

-1.91341

OBSN35

-1.92944

OBSV15

-2.49580

OBSV35

-2.49583

OBSN16

-1.87386

OBSN36

-1.90475

OBSV16

-2.51546

OBSV36

-2.69585

OBSN17

-1.81544

OBSN37

-1.82279

OBSV17

-2.39297

OBSV37

-2.49893

OBSN18

-1.91167

OBSN38

-1.86641

OBSV18

-2.71439

OBSV38

-2.53286

OBSN19

-1.90808

OBSN39

-1.89339

OBSV19

-2.44965

OBSV39

-2.56675

Source: Author

CS298 Report

39

Fall 2008

Sharmidha Govindaraj

Metamorphic Detection

Figure 19 below shows the scores of test set 1 and scores of compare set files for
model with three states; i.e., N=3 . There is a clear distinction of scores between family
and non-family viruses. Two of the normal files have scores closer to family virus scores
but doesn’t interleave the family virus scores.

Test Set 1, N=3
-1
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

-1.2
-1.4
-1.6

LLPO Score

-1.8
Family Virus
-2

Normal Files
Non Family Virus

-2.2
-2.4
-2.6
-2.8
-3

Fiile Number

Figure 19. Log Likelihood per Opcode (LLPO) of family viruses, non-family viruses and normal
files
Source:
Author’s Research

The score results shown in the above diagram is the typical range of scores we
obtained for all models. Refer Appendix B to view the graphs for all states. The overall
results show that HMM is able to separate the family viruses from normal files and nonfamily viruses regardless of number of states.
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To classify a file as family virus or non-member, we need to determine a cutoff or
threshold value. The files which are scored greater than threshold are considered as
family viruses and those which are scored lower than threshold is considered as nonmembers. Threshold is calculated as the average of minimum score of family virus and
maximum score of non member files.

Threshold = (MinDataLog + MaxCompareLog)/2
where
MinDataLog is the minimum score of family virus
MaxCompareLog is the maximum score of non member files

If score of a family virus is lower than threshold, it results in False Negative (FN)
prediction because a family virus is classified as non-member file. In other hand, if score
of a non-member file is greater than threshold, it results in False Positive (FP) prediction
because a non-member file is classified as family virus.

Table 8 shows the minimum score of NGVCK family viruses, maximum score of nonmember files and corresponding threshold assigned by each model. There are 25
different scores corresponding to 25 models. Two greatest and lowest thresholds are
marked bold in Table 8.
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Table 8. Minimum score of NGVCK family viruses, maximum score of non-member files and
threshold assigned by model
Test Set

Test Set 0

Test Set 1

Test Set 2

Test Set 3

Test Set 4

Min score of family
viruses

Max score of non
member files

Threshold

N=2

-1.9488

-2.1083

-2.0286

N=3

-1.8745

-2.1342

-2.0044

N=4

-1.8633

-2.0813

-1.9723

N=5

-1.8230

-2.0417

-1.9323

N=6

-1.7994

-2.0841

-1.9448

N=2

-1.9252

-2.1490

-2.0957

N=3

-1.8896

-2.1400

-2.0710

N=4

-1.9810

-2.1048

-2.0429

N=5

-1.9438

-2.1413

-2.0426

N=6

-1.9645

-2.1667

-2.0510

N=2

-1.9381

-2.1456

-2.0438

N=3

-1.8905

-2.1396

-2.0151

N=4

-1.8632

-2.1055

-1.9843

N=5

-1.8381

-2.1418

-1.9900

N=6

-1.8158

-2.1345

-1.9752

N=2

-1.9289

-2.1429

-2.0359

N=3

-1.8661

-2.1337

-1.9999

N=4

-1.8496

-2.0998

-1.9747

N=5

-1.8311

-2.1361

-1.9836

N=6

-1.8158

-2.1411

-1.9785

N=2

-2.0463

-2.1441

-2.0952

N=3

-1.9836

-2.1357

-2.0596

N=4

-1.9500

-2.1000

-2.0250

N=5

-1.9185

-2.1362

-2.0274

N=6

-1.9368

-2.1457

-2.0413

Source: Author’s Research
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A single threshold should be determined from the 25 thresholds assigned by the model.
The determined threshold will act as a cutoff point for all the model scores. If the
determined threshold is too small, FP rate will be increased. If the determined threshold
is too large, FN rate will be increased. The final threshold which is greater than all nonmember files and lower than all family viruses will avoid more FP and FN.

We

experimented with four different threshold values. The corresponding false prediction
rate can be viewed in Table 9 (page 50). The thresholds used for the experiment are
-1.93, -1.94, -2.07, -2.09. When the threshold is as large as -1.93, there are 15 FN. So,
only 25 of 40 family viruses are classified as family viruses and remaining 15 is
classified as normal file. Of the four thresholds used, only -2.09 and -2.07 results in
detection rate greater than 95%. -2.07 is considered as final threshold because the
number of false prediction is as low as 2 when compared to 4 for -2.09. The above false
prediction is FP resulting in classification of 2 non-member files as family viruses. Since
there are no FN when threshold is set to -2.07, detection rate is determined as 1.0000
where
Detection Rate = TP / #FV
where
TP - True Positives which means number of family viruses classified as

family

viruses
#FV - Total number of family viruses
In the above case where threshold is -2.07, all 40 family viruses are classified as family
viruses. So the detection rate is 1.000.
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Table 9. Thresholds and False Predictions
Test Set

-1.93
FP

N=2

N=3

N=4

N=5

N=6

-1.94

-2.07

FN Detect FP

FN Detect FP

Rate

Rate

-2.09

FN Detect FP FN
Rate

Detect
Rate

Test Set 0

0

3

0.925

0

2

0.95

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 1

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 2

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

1

0

1.000

Test Set 3

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

2

0

1.000

2

0

1.000

Test Set 4

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

1

0

1.000

Test Set 0

0

1

0.975

0

1

0.975

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 1

0

1

0.975

0

1

0.975

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 2

0

1

0.975

0

1

0.975

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 3

0

1

0.975

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 4

0

1

0.975

0

1

0.975

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 0

0

1

0.975

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 1

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 2

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 3

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 4

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 0

0

2

0.95

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 1

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 2

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 3

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 4

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 0

0

3

0.925

0

1

0.975

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 1

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 2

0

1

0.975

0

1

0.975

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 3

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Test Set 4

0

1

0.975

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

0

0

1.000

Source: Author’s Research
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Now, let us examine the training time of HMM to train each model. By default, HMM is
trained for 800 iterations. The running time of each iteration depends on number of
states N and length of observation sequence T. In our experiment, value of N ranges
from 2 to 6 and average observation sequence length is 65,450. The training time of
HMM ranges from 31 seconds for N =2 to 18 minutes for N = 6. Figure 20 below shows
the training time taken in seconds to create models with N ranging from 2 to 6.

Figure 20. Training time of 25 models for 800 iterations
Source: Author’s Research

Eventually, the trained model creates A, B and Pi matrices where A matrix is the state
transition probability, B matrix is the observation probability and Pi is the initial state
distribution. To examine the features of a virus, HMM observes the observation
sequence and plot the values in the B matrix. So, after a model is trained, HMM assigns
probability of occurrence of each opcode in particular state which can be viewed in B
matrix. Table 10 (page 52) shows transpose of B matrix for 2 states and test set 2.
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Table 10. Transposed B matrix for N = 2 and Test set 2

Opcode

Call
add
cmp
jz
lea
mov
xor
jnz
jmp
pop
push
retn
and
test

State 0

0.04139156206336
0.03274170541118
0.00712020350956
0
0.03349106402365
0.7834975094335
0
0
0
0
0.06910259796872
0.03265535759005
0
0

State 1

0.10697308319445
0.19756946116809
0.0329235076862
0.0329235076852
0.02797364747966
0.19927252251573
0.02828160382626
0.04193156798704
0.05445961728529
0.03281600972899
0.11012487167077
0.06104544906463
0.01339285867145
0.0169689229576

Source: Author’s Research

In table 10 above, any state with zero value means that the corresponding opcode
doesn’t belong to that state. For example, opcode jz has zero value in state 0 and nonzero value in state 1 which implies that jz occurs only in state 1.

In figure 21, the above table is plotted. The graph shows that opcode MOV occurs
mostly in state 0. Opcodes XOR, POP, AND, TEST, JZ, JNZ and JMP occur only in
state 1 and have zero probability in state 0. Rest of the opcodes occurs in both states.
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1

Probability

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
State 1
State 0

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
call add cmp

jz

lea mov xor

jnz jmp pop push retn and test

Opcode

Figure 21. Probability distribution of observation symbols in each state for N = 2 and test set 2
Source:
Author’s Research

6.3 Experiment Results II from Wong’s method
As discussed earlier, Wong’s method require disassembled executables as input. First,
all input executables should be disassembled. Using IdaPro, we disassembled the
same set of input files (200 NGVCK, 40 Cygwin, 15 G2 and 10 MPCGEN executable
files) used in our method and created respective asm files. We used the generated asm
files as input to the HMM. The typical observation sequence length of concatenated
opcode sequence ranges from 91,830 to 92,430 with an average of 92,130.

With N ranging from 2 to 6, and test sets ranging from 0 to 4, 25 models were created
with HMM. Let us examine how the HMM separated family viruses from compare set
files. All 25 models made a clear separation of scores between family viruses and
compare set files. Each model scored a data set consisting of 40 family viruses and
compare set consisting of 40 normal files and 25 non-family viruses.
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Figure 22 shows the scores of test set 1 and scores of compare set files for model with
three states; i.e., N=3 . There is no clear distinction and some interleaving of scores
between family viruses and normal files. About three scores of normal files are
interleaving with scores of family viruses.

Test Set 1, N=3
0
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

-20
Family Virus
Normal Files

-40
LLPO Score

Non Family Virus
-60

-80

-100

-120

Fiile Number

Figure 22. Log Likelihood per Opcode (LLPO) of family viruses, non-family viruses and normal
files
Source: Author’s Research

HMM is not able to determine a well defined threshold for any of the models, since the
maximum score of compare set is lesser than the minimum score of data set. For
example, for the model with N=3 and test set 1, the minimum score of data set is -5.9
and the maximum score of compare set is -3.0. Since, -5.9 is lesser than -3.0, it is not
able to find threshold. Also, due to the fact that all the models have interleaving scores,
HMM doesn’t find well defined threshold. So, after analyzing all the scores and keeping
the detection rate greater than 95%, we determine -5.4 as the threshold. With -5.4 as
threshold, there are 39 FP predictions and 7 FN predictions. Table 11 shows the FP and
FN for each model.
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Table 11. False Predictions for threshold = -5.4
Model

N=2

N=3

N=4

N=5

N=6

-5.4
FP

FN

Detection Rate

Test Set 0

1

0

1.000

Test Set 1

3

1

0.975

Test Set 2

3

0

1.000

Test Set 3

3

0

1.000

Test Set 4

3

0

1.000

Test Set 0

0

0

1.000

Test Set 1

3

1

0.975

Test Set 2

3

1

0.975

Test Set 3

3

0

1.000

Test Set 4

3

0

1.000

Test Set 0

1

0

1.000

Test Set 1

3

1

0.975

Test Set 2

3

0

1.000

Test Set 3

3

0

1.000

Test Set 4

3

0

1.000

Test Set 0

1

0

1.000

Test Set 1

3

1

0.975

Test Set 2

3

1

0.975

Test Set 3

3

0

1.000

Test Set 4

3

0

1.000

Test Set 0

1

0

1.000

Test Set 1

3

1

0.975

Test Set 2

1

0

1.000

Test Set 3

1

0

1.000

Test Set 4

1

0

1.000

Source: Author’s Research
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The diagrammatic representation of table 11 can be viewed in figure 23.

Figure 23. Number of false predictions at each state N
Source:
Author’s Research

Now, let us examine the training time of HMM to train each model. In default, HMM is
trained iteratively for 800 iterations. The run time of each iteration depends on number
of states N and length of observation sequence T. In our experiment, value of N ranges
from 2 to 6 and average observation sequence length is 92,130. The training time of
HMM ranges from 5 mins for N =2 to 48 minutes For N = 6. Figure 23 shows the training
time taken in seconds to create models with N ranging from 2 to 6.
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Figure 24. Training time of 25 models for 800 iterations
Source:
Author’s Research

6.4 Comparison of our method with Wong’s Method
To determine the efficiency and accuracy of our method, our results are compared with
Wong’s method. The observation sequence length and training time are compared in
figures 24 and 25 (page 58) respectively. The comparison shows that our method
produces smaller opcode sequence since we extracted only 14 MFO opcodes which
eventually results in lesser training time. Using our method, the training time is reduced
by 60%. So, our method shows significant improvement in efficiency.
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Opcode Sequence Length

100000
80000
Our Method
60000

Wong's Method
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20000
0
2

3

4

5

6

Number of States N

Figure 25. Comparison of opcode sequence length T in both methods
Source:
Author’s Research
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Figure 26. Comparison of HMM training time in both methods
Source:
Author’s Research

The total HMM training time is on average 4.5 hours for our method and 14.5 hours for
Wong’s method. Also, our program detects opcodes in the executables in less than 5
CS298 Report

52

Fall 2008

Sharmidha Govindaraj

Metamorphic Detection

minutes in comparison to IDApro disassembling which takes on average 1.5 hours for
same set of files. For the entire experiment, our method took only 4.5 hours compared
to 16 hours for Wong’s method. In summary, the overall performance is improved by
70% with our method when compared to Wong’s method.

In addition to performance, there is a clear distinction of scores between family viruses
and non-members in our method. With threshold set at -2.07, there are only 2 FP
predictions and no FN predictions resulting in 100% detection rate. In Wong’s method,
there is some interleaving of scores between family viruses and normal files. With
threshold set at -5.4, there are 39 FP predictions and 7 FN predictions resulting in 97%
detection rate. This shows that accuracy is significantly improved in our method when
compared to Wong’s method. Figure 27 shows the number of false predictions in our
method and Wong’s method.

Number of False Negative predictions

5

4

3

Wong's Method
Our Method

2

1

0
1

2

3

4

5

Number of States

Figure 27. Comparison of False Negative Prediction

Source: Author’s research
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7. Conclusion
Our method extracts code section from the virus binary files, detects MFO instruction
opcodes, forms opcode sequence, trains HMM, and scores test files. After careful
analysis of the virus files, 14 MFO instructions were identified (Billar) and corresponding
opcodes are collected to produce opcode table. The produced opcode table was used
in the process of forming opcode sequence. As the table is precise and concise, it helps
to improve overall efficiency significantly.
Our method achieved the primary goal of this work. It completely eliminated the manual
process involved in the disassembling phase, reduced the total running time by 70%,
and significantly improved overall efficiency.

8. Future Work
We extracted only the code segment from the executables. It can be expanded to
include data segment which will be challenging as it includes data in addition to the
function codes we are interested. Also, our opcode table consists of fewer number of 1byte opcodes that are searched indiscriminately resulting in ~3% false positives. It can
be further improved by analyzing the virus assembly files and determining conditions to
identify 1-byte opcodes.
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Appendix B: Converged HMM Matrices
Table B- 1. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 2 and Test Set 0
N=2, M=14, T=65538
I

1.00000000000000

0.00000000000000

A

0.97529089931559
0.07294422965863

0.02470910068450
0.92705577034146

B

call
and
add
mov
cmp
jz
lea
retn
jnz
jmp
push
pop
xor
test

0.11056864271285
0.01145967815425
0.18800057580368
0.21328078353347
0.03301040979904
0.06610252853323
0.02880279179210
0.06832909701597
0.03691201145227
0.04826955343759
0.12836473711460
0.02806701922270
0.02414499033569
0.01468718109252

0.01032365432858
0.00000000000000
0.00039631434332
0.95689813171848
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.03238189960963
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

Table B- 2. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 2 and Test Set 1
N=2, M=14, T=65637
I

A

B

0.00000000000000

1.00000000000000

0.99023469357353
0.00517079384893

0.00976530642649
0.99482920615105

call
add
cmp
jz
lea
mov
xor
jnz
jmp
pop
push
retn
and
test

CS298 Report

0.04138172849122
0.03279131576133
0.00713632659984
0.00000000000000
0.03353125642709
0.78330672606554
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.06899283786000
0.03285980879498
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

0.10732144082279
0.19815336386213
0.03265250124626
0.07525014019944
0.02783380289300
0.20080176000483
0.02768944552793
0.04211587933240
0.05519274352290
0.03204064411089
0.11016834858514
0.06120574059315
0.01328628016508
0.01628790913408
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Table B- 3. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 3 and Test Set 0
N=3, M=14, T=65538
I

0.00000000000000

1.00000000000000

0.00000000000000

A

0.70346079377318
0.07914393658555
0.00962002852435

0.29653920622679
0.91445966538834
0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000
0.00639639802613
0.99037997147564

B

call
and
add
mov
cmp
jz
lea
retn
jnz
jmp
push
pop
xor
test

0.18044259546229
0.00448429829006
0.03860749464897
0.02469929232564
0.00315211876847
0.01007609703007
0.01364679545996
0.07481661944953
0.00000000040173
0.01349456618584
0.49741215965854
0.13409826140688
0.00479799349001
0.00027170742202

0.08754297795188
0.01540292005154
0.24155284859017
0.25302357242172
0.04250330460559
0.09340170221697
0.03187212163422
0.05715118751145
0.05377853338374
0.06643437646140
0.00000000000000
0.00222230493117
0.03379418116171
0.02131996907845

0.04019049649330
0.00000000000000
0.03234418078082
0.78967988859470
0.00707130426832
0.00000000000000
0.03343588672210
0.03145387119567
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.06582437194508
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

Table B- 4. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 3 and Test Set 1
N=3, M=14, T=65637
I

1.00000000000000

0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000

A

0.70346079377318
0.07914393658555
0.00962002852435

0.29653920622679
0.91445966538834
0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000
0.00639639802613
0.99037997147564

B

call
add
cmp
jz
lea
mov
xor
jnz
jmp
pop
push
retn
and
test
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0.08867756472923
0.24121738466127
0.04101184800289
0.09241896276235
0.03188667648912
0.25488566270350
0.03378862068065
0.05332496381131
0.06621929897186
0.00276033294822
0.00000000000000
0.05831881713061
0.01562700800442
0.01986285910459

0.17378980549424
0.03794667554559
0.00177478727713
0.01063289662025
0.01347452830663
0.02044655468201
0.00468934596868
0.00025874665049
0.01336997690319
0.13469898314905
0.50857789021476
0.07320156127166
0.00433427248924
0.00280397542706

0.03999032275435
0.03246059846073
0.00711025515134
0.00000000000000
0.03362093725516
0.78988948068637
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.06538067722100
0.03154772847102
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
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Table B- 5. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 4 and Test Set 0
N=4, M=14, T=65538
I
A

B

1.00000000000000
0.44045057521127
0.62792547362477
0.00000000000000
0.34692889141062
call
and
add
mov
cmp
jz
lea
retn
jnz
jmp
push
pop
xor
test

0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000

0.53973027295562
0.18618315452008
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000
0.06922733549534
0.93607368937815
0.00000000000000

0.01981915183314
0.11666403635980
0.06392631062179
0.65307110858937

0.10436800534989
0.01349976044783
0.12144044526825
0.43023595328126
0.06604882783370
0.05917203374938
0.02271307888903
0.00000000261127
0.04796843467275
0.05028195162244
0.00000000000000
0.01372077231028
0.03990062711514
0.03065010684881

0.11822021256511
0.01245313695031
0.38719748586197
0.00000428494713
0.00000000000000
0.11726839434507
0.04655973578208
0.19447448317301
0.04358686152385
0.06789037513264
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.01234502971883
0.00000000000000

0.01027314932301
0.00000000000000
0.00028310901995
0.94952037682505
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.03992336483199
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

0.11612084862888
0.00522868141933
0.03441523285621
0.02275571968959
0.00688387326382
0.00244250914821
0.00178900787395
0.03303669112864
0.00038036414313
0.01315996772862
0.64946985760290
0.10874111229134
0.00557613422539
0.00000000000000

Table B- 6. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 4 and Test Set 1
I
A

N=4, M=14, T=65637
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000

1.00000000000000

0.80883316869008
0.27355240608643
0.00000000000000
0.15518518785122

0.03559313923522
0.00000000000000
0.94098770400506
0.00000000000000

0.09236454875772
0.08466369421419
0.00000000000000
0.78290356350103

0.06320914331696
0.64178389969937
0.05901229599492
0.06191124864767

B
call 0.12685046243687
add 0.23323765834646
cmp 0.00051981304233
jz
0.00951432313309
lea 0.04699127266348
mov 0.41101127083640
xor 0.01041078461638
jnz 0.00847781584294
jmp 0.02473783521184
pop 0.00693284728153
push 0.00000000000000
retn 0.10885509567445
and 0.00772252853900
test 0.00473829237528
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0.11199929673836
0.01851037291423
0.02147360786514
0.01066382234148
0.00000000000000
0.00407452652008
0.00447553751546
0.00075510653538
0.01120702111540
0.12426754287804
0.65300481051350
0.03444266696595
0.00335420883476
0.00177147926222

0.00853612550654
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.02799478588275
0.96346908861070
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

v

0.07280030502653
0.20897318307602
0.09134592516609
0.19608849354750
0.02116523853286
0.05420224430150
0.05970641577765
0.10764786651215
0.11054120772494
0.00000000024898
0.00000000000000
0.01633128223171
0.0230884120800
0.03810942577395
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Table B- 7. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 5 and Test Set 0
N=5, M=14, T=65538
I

0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 1.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000

A

0.9405214315319
0.1129644367010
0.0000000000000
0.0000000000000
0.0000000000000

B

call
and
add
mov
cmp
jz
lea
retn
jnz
jmp
push
pop
xor
test

0.00000000000000
0.70298632458623
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.16901480782446

0.01056237299509
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.96541995985256
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.02401766715236
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000
0.09892001655545
0.79609378295742
0.12417740830274
0.10904631245805

0.00000000151958
0.01524718919793
0.45736257029521
0.32951107919369
0.00000000000000
0.01951138082775
0.09208425527757
0.04667059388427
0.00000000000000
0.01529291004272
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.01730019345761
0.00701982630365

0.05947856846809
0.05531723665474
0.06543191922219
0.61586286167349
0.06774692082023

0.08555187476068
0.02162219579171
0.21841193435418
0.06029850748439
0.07921147534479
0.17251284419881
0.04100052758162
0.02742919903069
0.10327137331020
0.09963315594656
0.00000000000000
0.00131185622475
0.05199841067901
0.03774664529266

0.00000000000000
0.02981198550257
0.13847429782046
0.25995973002377
0.65419195889725

0.09267881503836
0.00509363523682
0.03472486592215
0.00000000000000
0.01712096169939
0.00594289633036
0.00191262451608
0.02172002194133
0.00000000000000
0.00798581331095
0.68180914402532
0.12620848711047
0.00480273486877
0.00000000000000

0.20923462951049
0.00058701342624
0.08567076329304
0.49279248754508
0.00492726978894
0.00000000000000
0.00436475670059
0.15532636270807
0.00000000000000
0.02856757841450
0.00000000000000
0.01281949026622
0.00570964834679
0.00000000000000

Table B- 8. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 5 and Test Set 1
N=5, M=14, T=65637
I

0.00000000000000 1.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000

A

0.64262392510210
0.07029776430647
0.06593363140192
0.06153810783160
0.05127506960621

B

call
add
cmp
jz
lea
mov
xor
jnz
jmp
pop
push
retn
and
test

0.13305877596495
0.83694713112539
0.28377975032280
0.00000000000000
0.07036255303579

0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00686837680517
0.00000000000000
0.0573136406037

0.00000000000000 0.22431729893291
0.00000000000000 0.09275510456816
0.64341824147011 0.00000000000000
0.93846189216840 0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000 0.82104873675419

0.11414312762067
0.09178780664076 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.1212773367205
0.01839111716720
0.22139415067586 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.2162526399498
0.01902016801018
0.06980192768685 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.0010256620639
0.00531781714927
0.15392450397864 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.0082371275539
0.00107196862260
0.03455297850306 1.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.0000000000000
0.00170007141622
0.09216764637624 0.00000000000000 1.00000000000000 0.51117361573010
0.00372769157841
0.05030631107538 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.0078690458847
0.00000000014669
0.09281179061727 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.0000000000000
0.00986206845249 0.09799374859572 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.01665250939040
0.12110891030325
0.00168433880047 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00865846380033
0.66134786029249
0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
0.04108521449830
0.04076323009906 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.09930854452460
0.00272393218346
0.02057069727973 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00652867029279
0.00050005255879
0.03224086967097 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00301638408870
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Table B- 9. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 6 and Test Set 0
N=6, M=14, T=65538
I
0.00000000000000 1.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
A

0.74654207880452
0.02060514556199
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.17068522563537
0.00000000000000

B

call
and
add
mov
cmp
jz
lea
retn
jnz
jmp
push
pop
xor
test

0.06015696292670
0.78892780154198
0.09872443224713
0.24213284361941
0.11758994250491
0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000
0.01379599847082
0.38675138566697
0.42371179827650
0.00000000000000
0.02253365781221
0.00000000000000
0.08894246264290
0.00000000000000
0.03388174710212
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.02053220621472
0.00985074381389
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0.04465832656218
0.05844976057459
0.56509608986430
0.00710552510345
0.09298246310421
0.05739856445345

0.11643327108490
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

0.03220936062184
0.13201729232145
0.33617947788853
0.02958095288687
0.61874236875556
0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.72118067839026
0.00000000000000
0.94260143554657

0.07963980903354 0.04474903481381 0.00000000000000 0.2726749917285 0.01054750258092
0.02259540505228 0.00558907307631 0.00000000000000 0.0004359338601 0.00000000000000
0.21282350028897 0.03986379770185 0.27309104766597 0.0739491617351 0.00000000000000
0.05194811358821 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.4178819850247 0.97785286398327
0.08312910828087 0.01519714332158 0.00000000000000 0.0113982201845 0.00000000000000
0.17868171055175 0.00200425425423 0.00000000000000 0.0083749572690 0.00000000000000
0.03668926127124 0.00000000000000 0.72530432647419 0.0203587104885 0.01159963343582
0.02453665903854 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.1450387602515 0.00000000000000
0.11272898499177 0.00000000000335 0.00000000000000 0.0000000000000 0.00000000000000
0.10379847545280 0.00779811304391 0.00160462585985 0.0197130677633 0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000 0.75945600474962 0.00000000000000 0.0000000000106 0.00000000000000
0.00002764719045 0.11947591062144 0.00000000000000 0.0278200833764 0.00000000000000
0.05507378660489 0.00586666841388 0.00000000000000 0.0023540626160 0.00000000000000
0.03832753865470 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.0000000656915 0.00000000000000
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Table B- 10. Coverged HMM Matrices for N = 6 and Test Set 1

N=6, M=14, T=65637
I

A

B

1.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
0.79902575937822
0.00004962226266
0.00000000000000
0.21315790437331
0.00001369512679
0.27132909596639

0.06884299516905
0.05402429439583
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

0.00000000000000
0.50987354539271
0.94315591906849
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000
0.00000000000000

0.00395962775884
0.14656884949096
0.00000000000000
0.49708269885924
0.93787525245430
0.02130601346098

Call 0.13186949046900 0.00000000000000 0.01033245540491
Add 0.22409281811031 0.33135053413181 0.00000000000000
Cmp 0.00325621138480 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
Jz
0.01673161748286 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
Lea 0.00529078865858 0.66864946586819 0.01319064156814
Mov 0.43823259448582 0.00000000000000 0.97647690302694
Xor 0.01264762393210 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
Jnz 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
Jmp 0.03387824544811 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
Pop 0.00890641093102 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
Push 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
Retn 0.11157074655939 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
And 0.01034303858470 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
Test 0.00318041395330 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
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0.06656516435248
0.15294718165373
0.00000000000000
0.21023608262221
0.06052839468865
0.06433438422900

0.0960162971704
0.1833326392870
0.0000000000000
0.2677942538386
0.0182121989531
0.0468122413825
0.0294594620569
0.1741889487909
0.1223503779078
0.0000000000000
0.0000000000000
0.0308303051582
0.0286673453200
0.0023359301341

0.06160645334139
0.13653650680411
0.05684408093152
0.07952331414521
0.00158265773027
0.64303050634357

0.0414220481090 0.11261960836740
0.2675745644057 0.01850064871170
0.2670579038232 0.01856606136724
0.0035045087466 0.00792665991814
0.0567012442008 0.00065911286116
0.0748684472089 0.00037493358845
0.1089340239043 0.00559008139898
0.0000000000000 0.00262644652140
0.0409882716703 0.01186122068469
0.0053662408508 0.11957216373433
0.0000000000791 0.66099864418808
0.0137436214224 0.03607282455750
0.0000000000000 0.00333377158292
0.1198391255784 0.00129782251794
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Appendix C: HMM Testing Results

Test Set 0, N=2
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Figure C- 1 LLPO Scores of Family Virus, Normal Files and Non-Family Virus for test set 0 and N =
2
Source: Author’s research

Test Set 1, N=3
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Figure C- 2 LLPO Scores of Family Virus, Normal Files and Non-Family Virus for test set 1 and N =
3
Source: Author’s research
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Test Set 3, N=4
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Figure C- 3 LLPO Scores of Family Virus, Normal Files and Non-Family Virus for test set 3 and N =
4
Source: Author’s research

Test Set 3, N=5
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Figure C- 4 LLPO Scores of Family Virus, Normal Files and Non-Family Virus for test set 3 and N =
5
Source: Author
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Test Set 4, N=6
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Figure C- 5 LLPO Scores of Family Virus, Normal Files and Non-Family Virus for test set 4 and N =
6
Source: Author’s research
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